INTRODUCTION
On 24 April 2008, the High Court dismissed the appeals of HML, SB and OAE 1 from unrelated decisions of the Full Court of the South Australian Supreme Court. The complainants were all adolescent girls. The defendants were the complainants' fathers in HML and SB, and the complainant's mother's brother in OAE. As well as giving evidence of the charged offences, the complainant in each case gave "relationship evidence" -evidence of other incidents in the sexual relationship of the defendant and complainant. Some of the other alleged incidents were uncharged sexual offences. 2 Other incidents constituted lesser misconduct, not necessarily criminal. In HML, for example, as well as evidence of uncharged intercourse, the prosecution adduced evidence that the defendant had bought her g-string underpants. 3 In each case, the defendant challenged the admissibility of the relationship evidence, and the adequacy of the trial judge's directions as to how it could be used. As discussed in Part 2, difficulties arise because evidence of this kind, as well as providing necessary context for the evidence of the charged offences also prejudicially reveals other sexual misconduct of the defendant. These questions were to be resolved as a matter of common law; however, the High Court's decision also has implications for jurisdictions now governed by the uniform evidence law or other legislation. 4 As Kirby J points out, relationship evidence is a topic on which there is a "mass of decisional authority … much of it difficult to reconcile". 5 Kirby J, the High Court's leading dissenter, 6 suggests that, given the frequency with which relationship evidence is adduced in child sexual assault cases, "if * Senior Lecturer at TC Beirne School of Law at the University of Queensland. 
CONTEXT AND PROPENSITY REASONING
The problems with relationship evidence are largely due to its capacity to support two different forms of reasoning. 13 First, relationship evidence "may provide a context helpful, or even necessary, for an understanding of a narrative".
14 Where the prosecution only pursues charges in respect of certain incidents out of a more extensive sexual relationship, it may be "misleading" and "unfair" to restrict the complainant's evidence to the charged offences. 15 [Relationship] evidence may disclose a course of events leading up to the first charged incident, which enables the jury to understand that the incident did not, as it were, "come out of the blue". The evidence will also sometimes explain how the victim might have come to submit to the acts the subject of the first charge. Without the evidence, it would probably seem incredible to the jury that the victim would have submitted to what would seem an isolated act, and likewise it might seem incredible to the jury that the accused would suddenly have committed the first crime charged. The evidence of uncharged acts may also disclose a series of incidents that make it believable or understandable that the victim might not have complained about the incidents charged until much later in the piece, if at all. They may show a pattern of behaviour under which the accused has achieved the submission of the victim. The evidence may establish a pattern of guilt on the part of the child, that could also explain the submission and silence of the child. 16 However, as well as providing context, relationship evidence has the potential to be used to support "propensity" or "tendency" reasoning. The defendant's commission of the uncharged sexual offences 6 against the complainant demonstrates the defendant's propensity for committing sexual offences against the complainant, and this propensity of the defendant increases the probability that the defendant committed the charged sexual offences against the complainant.
A particular variant of propensity reasoning is coincidence reasoning.
17 Propensity reasoning is sequential, moving from the uncharged allegations, to the defendant's propensity, to the defendant's guilt as charged. Coincidence reasoning is more holistic, treating the uncharged and the charged allegations as a group. Having regard to the similarities between the various allegations, there would appear to be three possible explanations: "[they would] all be true, or have arisen from a cause common to the witnesses, or from pure coincidence". 18 If there is no evidence of a common cause and coincidence appears implausible, then the allegations can be accepted as true. The propensity inference appears more appropriate where the other misconduct is accepted to have occurred, whereas the coincidence inference deals with the situations where the other misconduct is doubtful. But the defendant's propensity for misconduct is central to coincidence reasoning. "[A]n assumption of constancy or uniformity of action"
19 underpins both inferences. 20 Essentially the same admissibility principles apply to both coincidence and propensity reasoning.
21
Where relationship evidence is used to provide context, the defendant's propensity for misconduct is disclosed. However, this propensity is incidental rather than necessary to contextual reasoning. The focus of contextual reasoning is the complainant, not the defendant. The same contextual reasoning might be supported by evidence that did not disclose the defendant's propensity. For example, the complainant's submission and delayed complaint could be explained by evidence that the complainant had been sexually abused by someone other than the defendant. This background evidence may be weaker than evidence disclosing previous abuse by the defendant, but this still demonstrates that the defendant's propensity is not essential to contextual evidence.
By contrast, the defendant is at the centre of propensity reasoning, whether from uncharged offences, or lesser acts, such as grooming 22 or the buying of g-string underwear. In HML, Heydon J appears to question this, suggesting that tendency should be distinguished from mere sexual attraction. He quotes with approval Hodgson JA's observation that "I do not think it could be said that, because a married man feels sexually attracted towards a woman other than his wife, he therefore has a tendency to commit adultery with her, even if he never does so". 23 Fair enough. But the situation is entirely different if the evidence is used to support the claim that the man actually did go on to commit adultery. Of course, evidence of a pre-existing sexual relationship with the "other woman" would support a far stronger propensity inference, but the difference is one of degree rather than of kind. 
PROPENSITY EXCLUSIONARY RULE
The law has long had misgivings about the legitimacy of propensity reasoning. As Lord Herschell said in Makin v Attorney-General (NSW):
25
It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to shew that the accused has been guilty of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment, for the purpose of leading to the conclusion that the accused is a person likely from his criminal conduct or character to have committed the offence for which he is being tried.
26
But the exclusion is not absolute. Lord Herschell immediately added that "the mere fact that the evidence adduced tends to shew the commission of other crimes does not render it inadmissible if it be relevant to an issue before the jury". 27 However, the limits of the exclusion have been extremely difficult to pin down ever since.
Broadly speaking, there are two possible ways in which the exclusion may be confined. First, it may be limited in scope. Secondly, evidence caught by the exclusionary rule may exceptionally be admitted. As far as scope is concerned, one plausible interpretation of the rule is that the exclusion applies only where evidence is tendered, in Lord Herschell's words, "for the purpose" of propensity reasoning, and not where the evidence provides background and only incidentally reveals the defendant's propensity. This is the scope of the exclusion under the uniform evidence law, 28 and the common law has been widely assumed to also operate this way. However, uncertainties have lingered. HML brings these uncertainties to the fore without providing any clear resolution.
What is now clear is that evidence within the scope of the exclusion can exceptionally gain admission. To do so, the evidence must satisfy a special admissibility test. In 1991, in DPP v P
29
Lord Mackay, delivering the unanimous opinion of the House of Lords, suggested that the test was " [w] hether the evidence has sufficient probative value to outweigh its prejudicial effect". 30 Lord Mackay recognised that this balancing exercise presents "a question of degree"; 31 however, he added that "[j]udgments properly made in the light of appropriate principles should not, I think, yield results which could properly be described as a lottery". 32 In Australia, the High Court lent some support to the balancing test; 33 however, in 1995, a majority in Pfennig v The Queen expressed concern that "striking the balance … resemble[s] the exercise of a discretion rather than the application of a principle". 34 Instead, the majority fixed a high threshold of admissibility -similar fact evidence must be so probative that there is "no reasonable view of the evidence consistent with innocence of the accused". 35 The balancing exercise is eliminated. " [T] here is nothing to be weighed -at all events by the trial judge. The law has already done the weighing." 36 This was established as a matter of common law, which is the focus of the present discussion. Partly in response to Pfennig and its aftermath, most jurisdictions have reverted to a version of the balancing test. The Pfennig test appears to be a strict one. The standard that it imposes is derived from the circumstantial evidence direction, which in turn is derived from the criminal standard of proof.
38 A reasonable view of the evidence consistent with innocence equates with a reasonable doubt. The chief concern 39 with the evidence covered by the exclusionary principle is the risk of unfair prejudice -the risk that juries will be unduly influenced by it, and may convict on the basis of insufficient evidence.
40
But if the evidence is considered to eliminate innocence as a reasonable possibility -that is, prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt -then there is no room left for prejudice to operate. 41 Actually, while the Pfennig test is presented as a strict rule, it raises many questions of interpretation, and on one view which is given considerable support in HML, it may not be very demanding at all. This is explored in the next part of the article.
Nevertheless, the Pfennig test has been widely portrayed and viewed as "stringent", 42 and many courts and commentators doubted whether relationship evidence could satisfy it. 43 This in turn gave rise to some confusion as to how relationship evidence should be dealt with. 44 Many courts, perhaps as a trade-off against the stringency of the admissibility test, gave the exclusionary rule narrow scope. 45 It applies only where evidence is tendered for the purpose of propensity reasoning. Contextual relationship evidence is not excluded.
46
This was the dominant view, but it was not universally held. On occasion, relationship evidence, even for a context purpose, was considered to fall within scope of the exclusionary rule. 47 (The trade-off seemingly applied once more; a more relaxed interpretation of the Pfennig admissibility test was adopted.
48
) On other occasions, it was thought that relationship evidence, even for a propensity purpose, could avoid the exclusionary rule. 49 56 The same year Doyle CJ in Nieterink also suggested it is "not easy to extract clear and precise statements of principle", but considered "most members of the [High] Court have, at various stages, accepted the admissibility of uncharged criminal conduct, independently of the exclusionary principle". 57 In 2001 in KRM v The Queen, 58 McHugh J described the scope of the exclusionary rule as "an important question still to be resolved". 59 With Hayne J agreeing, he proposed that courts should continue to treat evidence that only "incidentally reveals propensity" as lying beyond the exclusion until the High Court decided otherwise. 60 But then in Tully v The Queen, 61 Callinan J challenged this proposal, 62 warning that "the prosecution may obtain the benefit of [the] prejudicial effect [of propensity evidence] without the disadvantage of the strictures that apply to evidence of that kind". 63 Callinan J, however, agreed with other members of the court that this was not a suitable case to resolve these issues. 64 HML, SB and OAE, were clearly perceived by the High Court to be suitable vehicles for resolving the issues surrounding relationship evidence. But the court was unable to agree upon what the resolution should be. Hayne J, with whom Gummow J and Kirby J agreed, gave the exclusion broad scope: evidence is subject to the exclusionary rule where it "will reveal an accused person's commission of discreditable acts other than those … charge[d] … [T]he exclusionary rule is not to be circumvented by admitting the evidence but directing the jury to confine its uses". 65 Gleeson CJ and Crennan J take a narrower view, supporting what was formerly the dominant approach -the exclusion is limited to evidence that is adduced to support propensity reasoning, including to demonstrate sexual attraction. 66 Kiefel J takes a similar line to Gleeson CJ and Crennan J, but considers that the scope of the exclusionary rule may be still narrower. Generally, the exclusionary rule -and the Pfennig test for admissibility -is limited to evidence tendered for the purpose of propensity reasoning. 67 However, where relationship evidence is tendered for a propensity purpose, Kiefel J suggests that "the test is artificial, and therefore not very useful". 68 Heydon J notes the "sharp divisions" in previous High Court decisions as to whether relationship evidence falls within the scope of the exclusionary rule, 69 but indicates that it is unnecessary to resolve them in the present case. 70 With the court spilt three or four ways, courts in future cases may look to the unified approach of Hayne, Gummow and Kirby JJ. However, their approach gives rise to difficult questions at different levels. Their broad exclusionary rule is a departure from their previous views, 71 contrary to what was previously the dominant approach, and inconsistent with the uniform evidence law. It has ramifications beyond just relationship evidence. There are other forms of evidence incidentally revealing the defendant's propensity that have previously been considered admissible, such as evidence that the defendant's motive for assaulting the victim was that the victim was blackmailing the defendant, 72 and evidence that the charged offence was committed by one prisoner on another. 73 Will evidence of this kind now be subject to the exclusionary rule?
The reason Hayne J gives for advocating the broad exclusion raises still broader concerns. He says:
[T]he foundation of the general exclusionary rule is that uses of the evidence cannot be segregated in the manner suggested. The very risk to which the general rule of exclusion is directed is the risk that the evidence will be misused. Judicial directions about use of such evidence have not hitherto been seen, and should not now be seen, as solving that problem. 74 Kirby J may not endorse this. Though "dubious … in scientific terms", Kirby J expressly adopts the "assumption, inherent in much appellate examination of jury decision-making, that members of a jury reach their conclusions by a process of deliberation from evidence to verdict by way of an accurate application of judicial directions on the law". 75 Heydon J also adopts this assumption, 76 and the remaining members of the court clearly consider it generally feasible for the jury to use relationship evidence to provide context while avoiding propensity reasoning. 77 If, in a given case, doubts arise as to whether the jury could be successfully confined to the legitimate reasoning, then the evidence can be excluded by exercise of the general trial judge discretion. 
PFENNIG ADMISSIBILITY TEST
As has been seen, HML contains conflicting views as to whether relationship evidence can bypass the Pfennig test. There is much greater agreement, even approaching unanimity, that relationship evidence can satisfy Pfennig if required to do so. This may simplify courts' treatment of much relationship evidence in the future. But uncertainties remain both as to the breadth of the court's conclusion on this point and the underlying reasoning. And HML does little, if anything, to clear up a range of uncertainties in relation to Pfennig, particularly when the court's fairly open approach in HML H is contrasted with the very stringent approach taken by the court in Phillips only 16 months before.
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Please email any queries to LTA.permissions@thomsonreuters.com comply with the Pfennig test. Hayne J goes so far as to offer this general statement: "sexual offences committed by an accused against the complainant (other than the offences being tried) … will usually, if not invariably" gain admission under Pfennig. 79 Gummow J and Kirby J agree with this aspect of Hayne J's judgment with little additional comment, 80 and Heydon J expresses a similar view. 81 The remainder of the court decided the case on other grounds, but all suggested Pfennig would be satisfied. 82 Kiefel J added, however, "that largely follows because the test is somewhat artificial, and therefore not very useful, in its application to cases of this kind". 83 And Crennan J indicates Pfennig "may" be satisfied, but unlike the rest of the court, her assessment is on the basis of context reasoning not propensity reasoning. 84 Despite the court's broad agreement about the satisfaction of the Pfennig test, questions remain. Relationship evidence may contain a diverse range of other incidents. How far does the HML proposition of admissibility extend? And what guidance does HML provide for non-relationship cases. Does it, for example, clarify or qualify what was said in the multiple-complainant case of Phillips in which propensity evidence was held inadmissible? 85 To answer these questions it is necessary to look behind HML's seeming consensus.
From Phillips to HML
As discussed in the previous section, Pfennig establishes a threshold of probative value that the disputed evidence must meet to gain admission. In Phillips, the High Court gave conflicting signals on Pfennig's operation. On the one hand, the court noted that a "stringent" rule was needed to guard against prejudice and ensure a "fair trial", and stated that Pfennig set "a high threshold … The evidence must possess particular probative qualities; a strong degree of probative force; a really material bearing on the issues to be decided". 86 On the other hand, the court mentioned certain assumptions -detailed below -that mitigate its stringency. But when it came to applying the Pfennig test to the disputed evidence in Phillips, it appears that the court had little regard to the mitigating assumptions and the evidence was held inadmissible.
87
HML contains similar competing elements, but with a changed emphasis. The risk of prejudice receives less attention and is at times downplayed. 88 To some extent this reflects evidential differences between the two cases. Relationship evidence may be less problematic than allegations from another alleged victim. As Hayne J points out, relationship evidence consists of allegations of a similar kind to the charged allegations and from the same source, but with less detail. 89 There is no obstacle to joining a number of counts relating to the same complainant, and evidence on different counts will be cross-admissible. 90 But joinder and cross-admissibility are highly contested in a multiple-complainant case like Phillips.
However, the factual differences with Phillips do not fully explain the greater openness to propensity reasoning in HML. There are other signs of a shift in favour of admissibility. In marked contrast with Phillips, Kirby J refers to a number of policy grounds favouring admissibility, including 79 Please note that this article is being provided for research purposes and is not to be reproduced in any way. If you refer to the article, please ensure you acknowledge both the publication and publisher appropriately. The citation for the journal is available in the footline of each page.
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91
He and Crennan J both cite landmark decisions from other jurisdictions favouring admissibility over exclusion.
92 "A law which prevents the trier of fact from getting at the truth by excluding relevant evidence runs counter to our fundamental conceptions of justice and what constitutes a fair trial." 93 In HML, a decision far longer than Phillips, 94 there are relatively few references to the test being "stringent" 95 or "narrow" 96 or setting a "high threshold". 97 The Pfennig test is occasionally formulated in a way "perhaps more favourable to admission"; 98 all that is required is that "there is no reasonable view of it other than as supporting an inference that the accused is guilty". 99 In comparison with Phillips, HML gives full force to the mitigating assumptions, and the probative value of propensity evidence is assessed with a far more positive attitude.
Credibility
It is helpful to break down the assessment of the probative value of the propensity inference into three parts. 100 First, how credible are the allegations of other misconduct? Did the defendant commit the other misconduct as alleged? Secondly, if the defendant did commit those other acts, to what extent does that suggest he committed the charged offence? The strength and peculiarity of the defendant's propensity will be revealed by the frequency of the other incidents and any distinctive or unusual features that they share with the charged offence. These first two factors determine the strength of the propensity inference in isolation. The third step is to place the propensity inference into the context of the prosecution case. What contribution does the propensity inference make to primary evidence of guilt?
In assessing, first, the credibility of the other allegations, the court in HML frequently refers to one of the mitigating assumptions identified in Phillips: "the trial judge assesses the probative value of the evidence in question upon the assumption that it is accepted". 101 Given that the disputed evidence is direct, this amounts to an assumption that the uncharged acts occurred as the complainant alleges. The first step in the propensity is therefore at maximal strength.
While this assumption has been noted in earlier cases, its effect has not been properly appreciated. In Phillips, it should have been assumed that the defendant did sexually assault all the other complainants, greatly strengthening the prosecution's propensity argument. But this effect of the 91 assumption was not expressly noted and the evidence was ultimately held inadmissible. 102 The assumption was noted in Pfennig and Hoch, 103 however, inconsistently, the court also suggested that the probative value of multiple allegations should be assessed as a coincidence inference, on the basis of the "improbability of similar lies". 104 In Hoch, the High Court held that that "joint concoction … destroys the probative value of the evidence" and if the judge considers this a "rational view" of the evidence, it should not be admitted. 105 Concoction may be viewed as a special case of credibility, 106 but Hoch is difficult to reconcile with HML. Obviously the risk of a "common cause" 107 -the various allegations being concocted together, destroying their probative value -is far greater with a single complainant than with multiple complainants. And yet there is no suggestion in HML that this risk could be an obstacle to admission.
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Strength and peculiarity
The second step concerns the strength and peculiarity of the propensity evidenced by the uncharged acts, and its significance for the charges. This feature was the focus of admissibility in cases such as Boardman 108 which emphasised the need for "striking similarity" between the other misconduct and the charged offence. In Phillips, the court held that "striking similarity" is "not essential", but suggested that "usually the evidence will lack the requisite probative force" without it. 109 In HML the expression "striking similarity" does not appear at all, but other comparable terms are employed. Hayne J indicates that the evidence would need to demonstrate a "particular distinctive propensity", and to have a "specific connexion with … the issues for decision". 110 Heydon J distinguishes "'general' or 'bare' disposition reasoning" from "specific disposition reasoning", recognising the distinction to be one of degree. 111 More problematically, Kiefel J suggests that the distinction is one of kind, between "forbidden reasoning" and "conventional probability reasoning". 112 In this connection, Hayne J highlights a particular feature of relationship evidence. " [T] he evidence would demonstrate that this accused had used this complainant as the object of sexual gratification. It is the particularity of that conclusion which gives the evidence its 'special probative value'." 113 Clearly, the propensity shown by allegations of multiple complainants would lack this specificity, even in a case like Phillips where the complainants were all girls of a similar age from the defendant's social circle. 114 As Heydon J, suggests, "to use various victims, without scruple and against their will, as objects of sexual gratification … is different from … the frequent use by the accused of his daughter as an object of sexual gratification". 115 This statement of Heydon J identifies a further respect in which relationship evidence may provide the basis for a strong propensity inference: typically, the other incidents are frequent and regular. The complainant in OAE, for example, said that the defendant's sexual contact with her "happened quite often … every couple of days" over a period of several years. 116 Compare this with Phillips which, for a multiple-complainant case, involved a relatively high number of incidents: eight counts relating to six complainants.
By its inclusion of frequent and numerous other incidents against the same complainant, relationship evidence may lend strong support for a propensity inference. A further factor to consider is the extent to which the other incidents resemble the charged offence. The resemblance will often be strong. For example, in OAE, one of the counts was for digital penetration, and the complainant indicated that she had "lost count" of the number of times the defendant had done this, but that it may have been "40, 50 times between when was I was 12 until I was 16". 117 However, relationship evidence covers quite a spectrum and may include incidents very different from the charged offence. In child sexual assault cases, evidence of grooming is common and can be important; 118 of its very nature, grooming builds up from relatively innocuous interactions with the child. 119 The relationship evidence in the present cases included conduct such as hugging, rubbing through clothes, and kissing. 120 Such evidence is capable of supporting propensity reasoning, but as the similarity with the charged offence decreases, the propensity inference will weaken, and the question arises whether such evidence would satisfy Pfennig. In Phillips, the court suggested "striking similarity" would ordinarily be required, 121 and the other complainants' allegations were held inadmissible because they were insufficiently similar in their details.
In HML, Hayne J's general statement about the admissibility of relationship evidence under Pfennig is confined to uncharged "sexual offences". 122 Kiefel J emphasises that "evidence of the offences themselves will largely be indistinguishable from the acts the subject of the relationship evidence … [R]elationship evidence is highly probative is because it is of the same type". 123 While Heydon J appears to consider that the defendant's purchase of g-string underwear for the complainant is admissible, 124 Hayne J views it as inadmissible, 125 and Crennan J suggests it is a "possible exception" to admissibility. 126 HML is authority that some relationship evidence will satisfy Pfennig, but just how much remains far from clear.
Primary evidence of guilt
The final matter to be considered in determining the strength of a propensity inference is its relationship with the primary evidence of guilt. Propensity evidence will rarely satisfy the Pfennig test by itself. As Gleeson CJ indicates: doubt which must be assumed to exist in relation to the evidence of charged acts by itself". 142 Future cases where the relationship evidence includes uncharged offences are likely to be decided in the same way as HML. But where the relationship evidence consists merely of grooming, the size of the deficit assumed to be left by the primary evidence may be crucial in determining whether Pfennig is satisfied.
INADMISSIBILITY OF CONTEXT EVIDENCE
As discussed in Part 3, Hayne, Gummow J and Kirby JJ support an exclusionary rule of broad scope. In their view, relationship evidence could not avoid exclusion by being admitted for a non-propensity purpose. Independently of this, they express some doubt as to whether relationship evidence would be admissible purely to provide context. Heydon J expresses similar doubts. However, if admissible for a propensity purpose, they would allow the evidence to be used to provide context. The majority's hesitation about admitting relationship evidence under the banner of "context" or "background" is expressed in both general and specific terms. The general concern is that these terms are too vague to justify bypassing the exclusionary rule. Kirby J indicates, "[i]f such a vague criterion were adopted, virtually any evidence of discreditable conduct, uncharged in the information or indictment, would arguably be relevant and admissible in such a trial, because every alleged crime has a 'context'". 143 One might respond that this objection, by itself, argues for caution rather than exclusion. Kiefel J holds:
[R]elationship evidence is relevant, but not in a general way and not by way of background or contextual evidence. It is relevant to answer questions which, in cases of the kind under consideration, may fairly be expected to arise in the minds of the jury were they limited to a consideration of evidence of the offences charged.
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She lists familiar questions: "whether the offences are isolated incidents; why the accused felt confident enough to demand the acts in question; why the child was compliant; and why he or she did not make a complaint to another person." 145 However, evidence tendered for such purposes does appear to pose heightened risks of muddy thinking. Kiefel J suggests that, in such a case, "the trial judge might fairly observe that the reference to other acts … does not logically prove the prosecution case or enhance the complainant's credit".
146
But as Heydon J points out:
[T]he uncharged acts evidence relied on to give background or context would be irrelevant and hence inadmissible unless the evidence rendered probable the existence of the charged act, or a fact relevant to a charged act … Background evidence "does support the guilt of the accused, by making the complainant's account of the assaults more believable". 147 This leads to the majority's more specific objection to relationship evidence used to provide background or context. While not expressing a final view, Heydon J questions whether using the evidence to answer these questions would be an "impermissible bolstering of the daughter's credit in (2008) Please note that this article is being provided for research purposes and is not to be reproduced in any way. If you refer to the article, please ensure you acknowledge both the publication and publisher appropriately. The citation for the journal is available in the footline of each page.
Please email any queries to LTA.permissions@thomsonreuters.com chief". 148 Hayne J, with Gummow J and Kirby J agreeing, suggests that the evidence "might be said to deal only with collateral issues that should not be explored at trial". 149 The remainder of the court did not agree with the majority. 150 The issue is a tricky one. As McHugh J notes in Palmer v The Queen, "[t]he line between evidence relevant to credit and evidence relevant to a fact-in-issue is often indistinct and unhelpful". 151 However, the minority view appears preferable. The evidence should be recognised as advancing the prosecution's case more broadly, and not as merely supporting the complainant's credit. In child sexual assault cases, it is often the case that the prosecution has direct evidence of the offence from the complainant, and little else. Background evidence giving plausibility to the prosecution's version of events does bolster the complainant's credibility. But the broader purpose of the evidence should not be lost sight of. Crennan J notes that evidence of a hostile pre-existing relationship between defendant and victim has served a similar function in circumstantial murder cases. Such evidence has been "properly admitted to proof as integral parts of the history of the alleged crime" 152 so that jurors do not have to decide the case "in a vacuum". 153 Without such evidence, the prosecution case would be "unreal and not very intelligible". 154 Clearly relationship evidence does not bolster the victim's credibility in a murder case. Evidence serving this function should not be excluded from child sexual assault cases simply because the prosecution case is heavily dependent on the complainant's direct evidence.
The rigid approach that the majority take to the bolster rule is arguably inconsistent with its function and nature. According to McHugh J in Palmer v The Queen, bolstering evidence is excluded "to prevent the trial of a case being burdened with the side issues that would arise if parties could investigate matters whose only real probative value was that 'they tended to show the veracity or falsity of the witness who was giving evidence which was relevant to the issue'". 155 Unlike the propensity exclusionary rule, the bolster rule is a "rule of convenience, and not of principle". 156 To "elevate" it to a "fixed [rule] of law … would be a mistake … If evidence going to credibility has real probative value with respect to the facts-in-issue … it ought not to be excluded unless the time, convenience and cost of litigating the issue that it raises is disproportionate to the light that it throws on the facts-in-issue". 157 However, it seems others on the High Court have not accepted the full implications of McHugh J's views. 158 Even on the majority view, there is potential for relationship evidence to be used for a bolstering purpose. This use will be open where the evidence is admissible for a propensity purpose. 159 To seek to prevent this would be inefficient and inconvenient. Further, the prosecution may be allowed to elicit bolstering evidence in re-examination, where the defence has raised those familiar questions about the complainant's credibility in cross-examination. As Heydon J points out, this carries the difficulty that "the complainant's account of all the abuse she has experienced may be offered in a fragmented way". 160 This inconvenience and inefficiency could be easily averted by adopting McHugh J's approach and allowing the contextual evidence to be provided in examination-in-chief.
The applicability of the bolster rule was not crucial to the resolution of the issues in HML since the evidence was otherwise admissible. But it may become decisive in other common law cases. Grooming evidence can provide essential context but it may not satisfy Pfennig. The majority views on the bolster rule also have implications for uniform evidence law jurisdictions. The tendency and coincidence rules has narrow scope, and relationship evidence may be admitted to provide context without attaining the threshold level of probative value. Under Adam v The Queen, 161 such evidence is not currently excluded by the credibility rule. 162 However, amendments have been proposed that would give the statutory "credibility rule" a similar operation to the common law "bolster rule". 163 If, following the majority approach in HML, contextual relationship evidence is classified as "credibility evidence" it would be excluded. 164 Although, as at common law, if the relationship evidence is found admissible under the tendency or coincidence rule, the evidence could also be used for a credibility purpose. And, despite the credibility rule, the evidence could also be adduced in re-examination. 
SEXUAL ATTRACTION AND THE STANDARD OF PROOF
The final major issue in HML concerns, not the admissibility of relationship evidence, but its use. A majority of the court supports the proposition that the jury should not draw a propensity inference from the defendant's demonstrated sexual interest in the complainant, 166 unless that sexual interest is found beyond reasonable doubt. Hayne J, with Gummow J and Kirby J agreeing, would have allowed the appeal in OAE on this basis. 167 They were in dissent. Gleeson CJ and Kiefel J supported the proposition, but held that the issue did not arise because the evidence was admitted to provide context not to demonstrate sexual attraction. 168 Heydon and Crennan JJ did not express a view since if such a direction was required it had been provided. 169 But despite majority support, it is very difficult to find a sound basis for this principle, either in the majority's reasoning or elsewhere. Indeed, the application of the standard of proof to this circumstantial inference appears contrary to the logic of proof.
Following the confusion generated by the majority in Chamberlain v The Queen, 170 a majority of the High Court laid down sound logical principles regarding the standard of proof and circumstantial evidence in Shepherd v The Queen. 171 Clearly the standard of proof applies to the material facts constituting the elements of the offence. But generally, the standard does not apply to the evidence and 
